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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The state appeals from the district court's order of dismissal. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
The state charged Chris McLellan with video voyeurism under I.C. § 18-
6609(2)(b) for disseminating images of intimate areas of Natalie N., his ex-girlfriend, 
without her consent. 1 (R., pp.24-25.) The preliminary hearing testimony established 
that Natalie and McLellan had two children together and had been in a romantic 
relationship from 2004 to the beginning of 2007, during which she participated with him 
in making a video of herself which exposed her fully naked body. (3/3/11 Tr., p.13, 
Ls.4-24; p.16, Ls.14-19; p.18, Ls.3-6.) Natalie never gave McLellan or anyone else 
permission to disseminate or publish videos of her naked. (3/3/11 Tr., p.16, L.25 - p.17, 
L.6.) 
In July 2009, Natalie married Thomas N. (3/3/11 Tr., p.3, Ls.18-19; p.12, Ls.23-
p.13, L.1.) In November 2010, Thomas was made aware of some videos on internet 
web sites that involved Natalie, and when he investigated, he found two web sites that 
showed a video of his wife engaged in apparent drug use, and one that showed her 
1 The Criminal Complaint alleged that McLellan: 
... did with the purpose of sexually degrading and/or abusing another 
person, to-wit: Natalie [N.], did intentionally disseminate, publish or sell 
any image or images of the intimate areas of Natalie [N.] without the 
consent of Natalie [N.] and with the knowledge that the image or images 
would sexually abuse or degrade her. 
(R., p.6.) 
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"undressing for the camera and then as the script rolled up there was some words at the 
end of it that said, in a graphic nature, fuck you, cunt." (3/3/11 Tr., p.5, L.11 - p.8, L.6.) 
After the Natalie and Thomas reported the incident to law enforcement, Detective 
Charles Lebar of the Boise Police Department interviewed McLellan, who admitted to 
posting the videos on the internet web sites because he was upset with Natalie over a 
child custody issue. (3/3/11 Tr., p.9, Ls.12-18; p.23, Ls.3-25.) Detective Lebar obtained 
a search warrant for McLellan's home and work place, and during the execution of the 
warrant, McLellan admitted to posting the video around February 2010 on several 
websites - Webs.com, Facebook, MySpace, and You Tube. (3/3/11 Tr., p.24, L.25 -
p.25, L.13.) During the execution of the search warrant, Detective Lebar found a copy 
of the video on McLellan's computer (3/3/11 Tr., p.25, Ls.17-20), which he described in 
the following colloquy with the prosecutor: 
A. ... It is a video of approximately two and a half minutes in length. 
Some of which - it starts out with a homemade scrolling portion of the 
video which has Natalie's name and various names that she has used in 
the past as well as describing her. 
Q. How does it describe her? 
A. Crack whore number one, crack whore number two, and I think 
crack whore number three is what it said. 
Q. And what does the video depict? 
A. That is just text as it scrolls up. It also included her husband's 
name. 
Q. That's not for the whole two and a half minutes. What else is on 
the video? 
A. It then goes into what appears to be homemade movies of a female 
that appears to be Natalie smoking something from aluminum foil. 
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Q. And as the video proceeds what else is on there? 
A. More text. There is also homemade sound effects. And then it 
goes into another video where the same female undresses in front of the 
camera. 
Q. And does it display her whole naked body? 
A. Yes, it does. 
Q. And how does the video conclude? 
A. With another text across the screen. 
Q. What does that text say? 
A. If I remember correctly, I think it said fuck you cunt. 
(3/3/11 Tr., p.26, L.12 - p.27, L.18.) 
At the end of the presentation of testimony, the state argued that McLellan had 
the intent to sexually degrade or abuse Natalie not only when he published her images 
on the web sites, but also when he "obtained" the images, because he did not obtain 
them until he edited them with the disparaging captions. (Tr., p.33, Ls.3-23.) The 
magistrate agreed with the state's position and concluded there was probable cause to 
bind over McLellan on the charge of video voyeurism. (R., p.20; 3/3/11 Tr., p.36, Ls.6-
21.) 
After the state filed an Information in district court (R., pp.26-27), McLellan filed a 
motion to dismiss the charge (R., pp.47-51), contending the magistrate court erred by 
ruling that the preliminary hearing testimony established probable cause to believe 
McLellan committed video voyeurism. At the end of the hearing on McLellan's motion to 
dismiss, the district court verbally dismissed the case, ruling that the state was required 
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to present evidence that McLellan obtained the images of Natalie without her consent, 
but failed to do so. (8/16/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.14-24.) 
The district court ordered McLellan's counsel to prepare an order based on the 
court's finding that a public offense was not committed. (8/16/11 Tr., p.5, L.25 - p.6, 
L.2.) However, the subsequent order prepared by defense counsel and signed by the 
district court did not comport with the court's verbal ruling. Rather, the written order 
refuted the state's argument that the images of Natalie were "obtained" only after 
McLellan added derogatory words to them, and held that the images were obtained 
when her "intimate areas" were first recorded, and dismissed the case because the 
state failed to present evidence that McLellan had the intent to sexually degrade or 
abuse Natalie at that earlier time. CR., pp.66-70.) The state filed a timely appeal. CR., 
pp.71-74.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it concluded that the testimony presented during 
the preliminary hearing did not establish probable cause to believe McLellan committed 
the crime of video voyeurism? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Concluded That The Testimony Presented During The 
Preliminary Hearing Did Not Establish Probable Cause To Believe McLellan Committed 
The Crime Of Video Voyeurism 
A. Introduction 
The district court dismissed the charge of video voyeurism, first verbally ruling 
that the state was required to show that the images of Natalie were obtained without her 
consent, and later signing an order dismissing the case on the basis that the state failed 
to present evidence showing McLellan had the intent to sexually degrade or abuse 
Natalie when he "obtained" images of intimate parts of her body. (R., pp.66-70; 8/16/11 
Tr., p.5, Ls.14-24.) The district court erred on both rulings. 
To demonstrate probable cause for the crime of video voyeurism under I.C. § 18-
6609(2)(b), the state was not required to establish probable cause to believe the images 
of Natalie were obtained without her consent, nor was it required to establish that 
McLellan had the intent to sexually degrade or abuse Natalie when he obtained her 
images. The testimony presented during the preliminary hearing clearly established 
probable cause to believe McLellan (1) intentionally disseminated or published images 
of intimate areas of Natalie's body without her consent, (2) with knowledge that the 
images were obtained with the intent "of arousing, appealing to or gratifying the lust or 
passions or sexual desires of such person or another person, or for his own or another 
person's lascivious entertainment or satisfaction or prurient interest .... " I. C. § 18-
6609(2)(b). Because the preliminary hearing testimony established the crime of video 
voyeurism, the district court erred in granting McLellan's motion to dismiss. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
A defendant challenging the sufficiency of evidence presented at a preliminary 
hearing must demonstrate that the State failed to present substantial evidence as to 
every material element of the offense charged. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.1 (b). Reviewing 
courts will not substitute their judgment for that of the magistrate as to the weight of the 
evidence and a probable cause finding will not be disturbed if any reasonable view of 
the evidence, including permissible inferences, support findings that the offense 
occurred and the accused committed it. State v. Pole, 139 Idaho 370, 372, 79 P.3d 
729, 731 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing State v. Holcomb, 128 Idaho 296, 299, 912 P.2d 664, 
667 (Ct. App. 1995». The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions 
of law over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 
Idaho 796,798,102 P.3d 1115,1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,405,94 
P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
C. The Testimony Presented At The Preliminary Hearing Provided Substantial 
Evidence That McLellan Committed Video Voyeurism 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent. State 
v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 
139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003). Because "the best guide to legislative 
intent" is the words of the statute, the interpretation of a statute must begin with the 
literal words of the statute. State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 
(2009). Where the statutory language is unambiguous, a court does not construe it but 
simply follows the law as written. McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 
810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006). Thus, if the plain language of a statute is capable 
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of only one reasonable interpretation, it is the Court's duty to give the statute that 
interpretation. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, _, 
265 P.3d 502, 509 (2011) (disavowing cases with language that Court might not give 
effect to unambiguous language of statute if such was "palpably absurd"). 
I.C. § 18-6609(2)(b) provides in relevant part: 
(2) A person is guilty of video voyeurism when, with the intent of arousing, 
appealing to or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of such 
person or another person, or for his own or another person's lascivious 
entertainment or satisfaction of prurient interest, or for the purpose of 
sexually degrading or abusing any other person: 
(b) He intentionally disseminates, publishes or sells any 
image or images of the intimate areas of another person or 
persons without the consent of such other person or persons 
and with knowledge that such image or images were 
obtained with the intent set forth above. 
(Emphasis added.) Under I.C. § 18-6609(2)(b), McLellan committed the crime of video 
voyeurism if he intentionally disseminated or published intimate images of Natalie 
without her consent, "and with knowledge that such image or images were obtained with 
the intent set forth above." The phrase, "the intent set forth above," refers to the 
opening sentence of I.C. § 18-6609(2), which, in turn, describes the alternate intents of 
"arousing, appealing to or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of such 
person or another person, or for his own or another person's lascivious entertainment or 
satisfaction of prurient interest, or for the purpose of sexually degrading or abusing any 
other person[.]" Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, under the plain language of I.C. § 18-
6609(2), the state was entitled to bind McLellan over to district court for video voyeurism 
if any reasonable view of the evidence showed McLellan "intentionally disseminate[d)" 
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intimate images of Natalie "without [her] consent" and with "knowledge" that the images 
"were obtained" "with the intent of arousing, appealing to or gratifying the lust or 
passions or sexual desires of [himself] or another person, or for his own or another 
person's lascivious entertainment or satisfaction of prurient interest" State v. Reyes, 
139 Idaho 502, 506, 80 P.3d 1103, 1107 (Ct. App. 2003) ("At the hearing, the state 
need only show that under any reasonable view of the evidence, including permissible 
inferences, it appears likely that an offense occurred and that the accused committed 
it."); State v. Wengren, 126 Idaho 662,665,889 P.2d 96,99 (Ct. App. 1995). The state 
presented such testimony at the preliminary hearing. 
McLellan was shown to have had knowledge that the images of the intimate 
areas of Natalie's body were obtained for one or more of the types of sexual intent 
described in I.C. § 18-6609(2). As Natalie testified, when she and McLellan were still 
together, she participated with him in making "naked videos" on at least one occasion. 
(3/3/11 Tr., p.16, Ls.17-21.) According to Thomas N., the videos showed Natalie 
undressing for the camera, and displayed her breasts, vagina and buttocks. (3/3/11 Tr., 
p.8, Ls.2-13.) Without need to explain the obvious, it is enough to say that the intimate 
nature of the videos alone establishes probable cause to believe McLellan knew the 
images were obtained "with the intent of arousing, appealing to or gratifying the lust or 
passions or sexual desires of [himself] or another person, or for his own or another 
person's lascivious entertainment or satisfaction of prurient interest." I.C. § 18-6609(2). 
The evidence presented during the preliminary hearing also provided probable 
cause to believe McLellan "intentionally disseminate[d] ... images of the intimate areas 
of [Natalie] ... without [her] consent .... " I.C. § 18-6609(2). McLellan admitted to 
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Detective Lebar that he posted the videos on the web sites because he was upset with 
Natalie over a child custody issue. (3/3/11 Tr., p.9, Ls.12-18; p.23, Ls.3-25.) Natalie 
testified that she did not give McLellan or anyone else consent to post the intimate 
images of her body on the internet web sites. (3/3/11 Tr., p.16, L.25 - p.17, L.6.) 
In sum, the preliminary hearing evidence testimony provided probable cause to 
believe McLellan intentionally disseminated images of intimate parts of Natalie's body 
on various internet web sites without her consent, and with knowledge that the images 
were obtained with the intent to "arousing, appealing to or gratifying the lust or passions 
or sexual desires of [himself] or another person, or for his own or another person's 
lascivious entertainment or satisfaction of prurient interest." I.C. § 18-6609(2). 
Therefore, the magistrate court's decision that the state presented probable cause to 
believe McLellan committed the crime of video voyeurism must be upheld and the 
district court's contrary decision reversed. 
D. The District Court's Verbal Ruling Was Incorrect 
At the end of the hearing on McLellan's motion to dismiss, the district court 
verbally ruled that the state was required to show the videos of Natalie were obtained by 
McLellan without her consent, and because it did not provide such evidence, dismissal 
was appropriate. The court said: 
There was a missing element in this case in my view, and that is 
that it is an essential element of this offense not just that a defendant 
publish the naked pictures and the crack smoking, and so forth, on the 
Internet without the consent of the victim, but that the images were 
obtained without the consent. 
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There's no evidence to support that contention. Therefore, the 
motion is granted, the case is dismissed, and that's going to be the order 
of the court. 
(8/16/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.14-24.) 
The district court's verbal ruling that the state was required to show McLellan 
obtained the videos of Natalie without her consent was incorrect. Although I.C. § 18-
6609(2)(b) provides that the dissemination or publication of intimate images must be 
done without the consent of the victim, there is no requirement that the images be 
obtained without the victim's consent. The only time "consent" is mentioned in I.C. § 18-
6609(2)(b) is in reference to a person who "disseminates, publishes or sells any image . 
. . of the intimate areas of another person ... without the consent of such other person . 
. .. " (See id (emphasis added).) The video voyeurism statute does not require that the 
images of intimate areas of the victim be obtained without the victim's consent. The 
district court's verbal conclusion otherwise was incorrect as a matter of law. 
E. The District Court's Ruling In Its Memorandum Decision And Order Granting 
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss Was Incorrect 
The district court's written order granting McLellan's motion to dismiss was based 
on the misplaced assumption that, to prevail at the preliminary hearing, the state was 
required to show probable cause to belief that, when McLellan disseminated or 
published the images of Natalie, he knew they had been obtained with the sole intent to 
sexually degrade or abuse her. (R., pp.66-70.) Based on that errant assumption, the 
district court concluded that because McLellan "obtained" the images of Natalie when 
he first video-taped her -- not when he later edited them with derisive comments and 
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published them -- the state failed to show he had the intent to sexually degrade or 
abuse her when he obtained the images. (ld.) 
Assuming the images of the intimate areas of Natalie's body were "obtained" at 
the time she was video-taped naked (vis-a-vis when words were added), the testimony 
presented during the preliminary hearing established probable cause to believe 
McLellan committed the crime of video voyeurism because he knew the images were 
obtained with one or more of the other alternate intents listed in I.C. § 18-6609(2) --
"arousing, appealing to or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of such 
person or another person, or for his own or another person's lascivious entertainment or 
satisfaction of prurient interest .... " Id. As noted, the inference that McLellan 
"obtained" the images of the intimate areas of Natalie for sexual gratification or appeal is 
apparent. The intent was obviously to fill some type of sexual appetite of McLellan or 
another person. 
"[A] magistrate's finding of probable cause at a preliminary hearing will not be 
disturbed if, under any reasonable view of the evidence including permissible 
inferences, it appears likely that [video voyeurism] occurred and that [McLellan] 
committed it." Pole, 139 Idaho at 372, 79 P.3d at 731 (citations omitted). The district 
court erred by requiring the state to establish probable cause to believe McLellan knew 
the images of Natalie were obtained with only the intent to sexually degrade or sexually 
abuse her. I.C. § 18-6609(2) The testimony at the preliminary hearing clearly 
established that when McLellan published the images, he knew they had been obtained 
(by him) with one or more of the other alternate intents. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the order dismissing this 
case, reinstate the Information, and remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this 13th day of March 2012. 
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